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I
n the United States, a custodial par-
ent has the right and responsibility
to make medical decisions for one’s
child. But does that right encompass
consenting for a surgical procedure for
which there is little or no medical justifi-
cation? What if the noncustodial parent
opposes the procedure? And when is a
child old enough to make the decision
for him- or herself? How should a physi-
cian respond when asked to perform a
surgical procedure when the decision is
enmeshed in family controversy? These
and other questions are considered in
Boldt, a recent family law case decided
by the Supreme Court of Oregon.1
The Boldts belonged to the Russian
Orthodox Church when they married
and had a child. They divorced in 1999
and embarked on an acrimonious battle
for child custody. Custody of their son,
whom the Court calls “M,” was first
awarded to Ms. Boldt, and four years
later to Mr. Boldt. The Boldts appeared
in court again in 2005. In the years
since his divorce, Mr. Boldt had become
increasingly interested in Judaism, and
in 2004 he converted. Mr. Boldt had
been taking M to a synagogue where M
was learning Hebrew. Mr. Boldt men-
tioned his conversion to his ex-wife,
adding that M might convert as well,
and that in order to do so, the boy
would need to be circumcised. 
Lia Boldt reacted to this news by get-
ting a temporary restraining order to
forbid Mr. Boldt from having M cir -
cumcised, and by filing a motion for a
change of custody. Amicus briefs were
filed by the American Jewish Congress
and by Doctors Opposing Circumcision
(DOC). Al though the case had begun
when M was 9, he was 12 by the time it
reached the state Supreme Court.
This case evoked a number of argu-
ments, especially regarding religious
freedom. From a medical ethics perspec-
tive, it is relevant that the procedure
would be performed by a licensed physi-
cian, that the same physician (a urolo-
gist) claimed that “there were medical
concerns that were sufficient cause…for
the procedure” and that the urologist
claimed that the boy understood the
procedure and “wanted the circumci-
sion so that he could convert to
Judaism.” The father’s argument was,
first, that his son wished to have the
 procedure, and second, that his son’s
wishes were none theless “legally irrele-
vant,” because a custodial parent has
complete authority to make medical
decisions. The mother argued that the
boy had told her that he didn’t want to
be circumcised but was “afraid” to con-
tradict his father. She also asserted that,
be cause of the “significant” medical risks
associated with the procedure, M should
not be circumcised even if he stated he
wanted the procedure. Lawyers for DOC
claimed that the urologist’s medical
claims were bogus, or resulted from
ignorance of the natural physical matu-
ration of an uncircumcised boy.
The court concluded that, “although
circumcision is an invasive medical pro-
cedure that results in permanent physi-
cal alteration of a body part and has
attendant medical risks, the decision to
have a male child circumcised for med-
ical or religious reasons is one that is
commonly and historically made by par-
ents in the United States. We also con-
clude that the decision to circumcise a
male child is one that generally falls
with in a custodial parent’s authority,
unfettered by a noncustodial parent’s
concerns or beliefs—medical, religious
or otherwise.” However, because M is
now 12, the court took into account the
boy’s own opinions in this matter. Re -
membering that this is primarily a cus-
tody case, the court ruled that if M did
oppose circumcision, then forcing it up -
on him against his will would seriously
impair his relationship with his father,
thus giving weight to the mother’s claim
to have custody reconsidered. The court
remanded the case to the trial court to
determine M’s opinion about a possible
circumcision. Meanwhile, the boy has
finally been furnished with his own
legal counsel, separate from the par-
ents’ lawyers.2
I will not review the medical pros
and cons of male circumcision. Suffice
it to say that both risks and benefits are
modest, causing the American Academy
of Pediatrics, in 2005, to conclude that
“Existing scientific evidence demon-
strates potential medical benefits of
newborn male circumcision; however,
these data are not sufficient to recom-
mend routine neonatal circumcision.”3
Some of those benefits apply only to
infants, so the benefit to M at age 12 is
low. There is evidence from Africa that
male circumcision has a protective ef -
fect against a number of sexually trans-
mitted diseases. The extent to which
this is true in the North American
 context is not known. Certainly the
 circumcision of a preteen boy is neither
routine nor usually a medical necessity.
(If the testimony of the urologist were
dispositive, this case would have been
over a long time ago.) So this case raises
questions for a physician:
(1) Are there any circumstances in
which a physician should per-
form cosmetic† surgery on a
minor?
(2) Should a physician take into
account a conflict between
divorced parents about the
child’s best interests?
It is certainly possible to take a purist
stand and refuse to perform any med-
ically unnecessary procedure on a
minor, from ear piercing to rhinoplasty.
One could argue that these are nonre-
versible procedures that only a compe-
tent adult (or mature adolescent)
should be permitted to make, and that
there is often little harm in waiting until
the child is 18 to perform the proce-
dure. That position would rule out even
routine newborn circumcision.
However, most pediatricians would
attempt to balance the pros and cons of
the procedure, the best interests of the
child, and deference to parental deci-
sion-making authority. The law invests
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*I have benefited greatly from the ideas of Ron
Brauner, Doug Diekema and Janet Dolgin, all of
whom participated with me in a panel on this
case at American Society of Bioethics and
Humanities, and from the work of my research
assistant, Alexandra Jeanblanc.
†I use the term “cosmetic” with some misgivings,
as this might appear to trivialize a religious moti-
vation. The term “elective,” however, still suggests
an underlying medical reason, and “nonmed-
ically indicated” is clumsy.
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parents with this authority because par-
ents are believed to act in the best inter-
ests of their children, and because
parents have the right to raise children
in their own religion and culture. The
latter right has obvious limits; we do not
permit parents to deny their children
an education, nor to perform female
genital cutting.‡ Taking all this into
account, performing circumcision on a
newborn at the parents’ behest seems
ethically acceptable, despite the fact
that it deprives children of the freedom
to make this important decision for
themselves at a later time. When par-
ents choose circumcision out of reli-
gious conviction, the procedure
provides the added benefit of allowing
the child to feel like a full member of
the group, and in the Jewish context to
become bar mitzvah at age 13.
the health of food consumers, it is ethi-
cally necessary to consider such effects
(along with animal and environmental
impacts) when evaluating proposals of
the sort that Joseph and Nestle endorse
in their concluding paragraph. The idea
that farming and food production can
be treated like any other sector of our
economy invites an overly simplified pic-
ture of food ethics. Farming performs
many functions for us. Becoming land-
scapes and cultural meanings are impor-
tant. Neither would I be too quick to
dismiss the accumulated wisdom of past
thinkers cited above. And one thing that
they perhaps overlooked is that a society
embedded firmly in the quotidian tasks
of farming is less likely to underestimate
its dependence on the continued func-
tioning of natural eco systems. What is
more, the recent growth of “slow food,”
farmers’ markets and organic diets sug-
gests that reconnection with farmers
may be part and parcel of effective
reform. This presupposes, however, that
there are farmers at those markets for
people to reconnect with. 
In short, no short development of
these themes can hope to be convinc-
ing. Yet food ethics must continue to
bear Lincoln’s concern for farmers and
rural communities in mind, even while
searching for a balance of the concerns
that authors such as Lappé, Singer and
now Joseph and Nestle introduce to
counter Lincoln’s advocacy of pushing
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the soil to its limit. Food ethics is every
bit as complex as medical ethics. 
Paul B. Thompson
W.K. Kellogg Professor of Agricultural,
Food and Community Ethics
Department of Philosophy 
Michigan State University
East Lansing, Michigan
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R
esponse: We greatly admire Paul
Thompson’s work and concur
with his insistence that food
ethics encompass the broad social con-
sequences of dietary habits and policies,
among them the costs to farmers and
agrarian values.
Thompson reminds us why farming
has long been venerated by philoso-
phers, poets and politicians. Farming
demands responsibility, independence,
ingenuity and thrift—as well as a (now)
rare intimacy with the natural world. If
our current food landscape is indeed
characterized by caloric excess, ecologi-
cal pollution and bewildering market-
ing claims, it is in part because we have
forgotten small farms and the virtues of
care, economy and prudence that they
promote and sustain.
We ignore agrarian values at great
peril to human health. Although it is
understandable why farmers have
exchanged rural life for urban ameni-
ties, this shift affects the way we feed
and care for ourselves. Current agricul-
tural practices may be productive, but
they harm soil, animals and farm work-
ers, and their inexpensive and excessive
calories damage human health.
While a “philosophical error” may
have led to this situation, its solution
‡For a comparison between legal attitudes toward
male circumcision and female genital cutting in
the United States, see Davis DS, Male and female
genital alteration: a collision course with the
law?” Health Matrix Summer 2001 11/2.
A 12-year-old boy, however, is hardly
a newborn. One could imagine that M
has embraced Judaism, as his father
claims, and has Jewish friends, perhaps
all of whom will soon become bar mitz-
vah. It would be rational for M, despite
the discomfort and risks of circumci-
sion, to choose to undergo the proce-
dure in order to be a full member of
the Jewish community now, and if this is
truly his wish, it would be wrong to
force him to wait until he is 18, because
his mother opposes circumcision. But
one could equally imagine that M
would just as soon not go through a
painful and medically unnecessary pro-
cedure, that he is not enthusiastic about
Judaism and that he feels somewhat
intimidated by his father. In that case,
requiring that he wait until he is of legal
age harms no one, and gives M the
space and protection he needs to make
a more autonomous decision when he
is older. Furnishing the boy with his
own lawyer is long overdue. Hopefully,
the hearing in family court held on
April 22, 2009, will resolve some of
these questions.
From the physician’s perspective, it is
difficult to imagine a doctor who would
perform elective surgery on a protesting
or even an unenthusiastic preteen. The
principle of respect for autonomy
requires that persons with the mental
capacity to make certain medical deci-
sions have those decisions respected.
Circumcision, with modest benefits and
risks, is well within the capacity of a boy
of M’s age. Although legally M’s assent
may be irrelevant, it is highly relevant to
any physician and in my opinion, no
doctor should perform this surgery
unless he or she is confident of M’s
enthusiastic (not merely passive) partici-
pation. If M appears unsure or intimi-
dated, nothing is lost by waiting until he
is more certain of what he wants. 
1344 Ore. 1; 176 P.3d 388; 2008 Ore.
LEXIS 3.
2Personal conversation with John V.
Geisheker, General Counsel, Doctors
Opposing Circumcision.
3American Academy of Pediatrics, Task
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 Policy Statement,” Pediatrics 103, no. 3
(1999): 686–93.
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